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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Jenkins case, the act was clothed in the dignity and authority of the
state and would seem to fall within the principle of respondeat superior.
If the State of North Carolina were liable "in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions against individuals,"3 3 the plaintiff in
the Jenkins case would have been compensated for an obvious wrong.
34
It is submitted that the North Carolina act should be amended to pro-
vide not only for the negligence of state employees, but also for in-
tentional wrongs committed by employees while acting within the scope
of the employment. There seems to be no logic nor valid reasons for re-
stricting sovereign liability to acts of simple negligence.
B. FRANK MAREADY.
Workmen's Compensation-Employees of Subcontractors-Rights
Against Owners and Principal Contractors
In Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co.' the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that an employee of an independent contractor, who operated
'the millinery department of defendant department store, could not main-
tain an action at law for negligence against the department store, but
that her remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive.
The Court held that the department store was an owner within the
South Carolina act,2 and the independent contractor operating the
millinery department was performing part of the "trade business or occu-
pation" of the department store so as to make the department store liable
to the employees of the millinery department for workmen's compensa-
tion.
The contract between the millinery company and the department
store gave the latter direct supervision over the operation of the depart-
ment, and stated that the name of the millinery company was not to be
used, but that it was to operate and advertise in the name of the depart-
ment store. The money from all sales was paid to the cashier of the
3 From the N. Y. Act; N. Y. CT. CL Acr § 8 (1939).
a" In view of the facts as found in the Jenkins case, the following excerpt from
a letter to the writer from the plaintiff's attorney is significant: ". . . the patrolman
who shot and killed D. C. Jenkins was tried ... upon a charge of manslaughter
.... [A]t the conclusion of the State's evidence, the court sustained the defendant's
motion for judgment as of nonsuit and directed a verdict of not guilty."
- S. C. -, 96 S. E. 2d 566 (1957).
S. C. CODE § 72-11 (1952). When any person, in this section . . .referred
to as owner, undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his
trade, business, or occupation, and contracts with any other person (. . . referred
to as subcontractor) for the execution or performance by or under such sub-
contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the
owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensa-
tion under this title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had
been immediately employed by him..
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store, who would pay the salary of the employees of the millinery de-
partment, and remit the excess to the manager of the millinery depart-
ment.3
This decision is in line with previous South Carolina cases, 4 though
there is a split of authority throughout the United States on just what
is within the trade, business or occupation of an employer. The courts
seem to agree that an orchestra or band playing in a restaurant or caf6
under contract is carrying on an integral part of the business of the
restaurant or caf6,5 but an independent contractor operating a lunch-
eonette and soda fountain in a department store was held not to be
engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the department store.0
Larson states the general test to be: ". . whether this indispensable
activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees
rather than independent contractors."'7
The section of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act
dealing with statutory employers8 differs from that of South Carolina
in that it applies only to any principal contractor, intermediate con-
tractor, or subcontractor; it thus excludes owners and principal em-
ployers.9 Although many of the workmen's compensation acts did not
originally include them, provisions are rapidly being added in the differ-
ent jurisdictions, making "principals," "principal employers," "general
contractors," etc., liable for compensation to employees of independent
contractors and subcontractors."0  Of the forty-one states which have
statutory employer provisions in their workmen's compensation acts,"
only eleven exclude owners and principal employers.' 2 One avowed
purpose of the North Carolina statutory employer provision is to fore-
' The manager was employed directly by the contractor, and was not led to
believe that he was working for the department store as was the injured employee.
"Boseman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S. C. 479, 8 S. E. 2d 878 (1940), which held
that a contractor engaged in painting the water tank of a textile mill was per-
forming an integral part of the business of the mill even though the water tank
was only used for fire prevention purposes. Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190
S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2d 825 (1939), which held that an employee of a contractor,
who had contracted to paint the transmission line poles of the power co., was en-
gaged in work which was within the trade, business, or occupation of the power co.
See Blue Ridge Rural Electric Corp. v. Byrd, 238 F. 2d 346, (4th Cir. 1956).
Malony v. Industrial Commission, 242 Wis. 173, 9 N. W. 2d 623 (1943). Cf.
Steele Pier Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 127 N. J.
L. 154, 21 A. 2d 767 (1941); Palumbo v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 148 Pa. Super. 289, 25 A. 2d 80 (1942).
6 Stratis v. McLellen Stores Co., 311 Mass. 525, 42 N. E. 2d 282 (1942).
I Larson, WOKRIMFN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 49.12 (1952).8 N. C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19 (1950).
D Green v. Spivey, 236 N. C. 435, 73 S. E. 2d 488 (1952).
" Annor., 58 A. L. R. 872 (1929).
"California, Delaware, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and West Virginia have no statutory employer provisions in theii workmen's com-
pensation acts.
" Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.
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stall evasion of the Workmen's Compensation Act by those who might be
tempted to subdivide their regular operations with the workers, thus
regulating them for compensation purposes to small subcontractors, who
fail to carry, or if small enough may not even be required to carry, com-
pensation insurance."' 3 It would seem that to achieve this purpose the
statutory policy should be extended to owners and principal employers
as well as contractors. Under the North Carolina act it would be
possible for an employer to let out all his work to small contractors, and
escape the payment of workmen's compensation, being liable to the em-
ployees of these contractors only as a "third party" in an action at law
based on negligence. There is little incentive for the employer to require
the contractor to comply with the act, and employees of insolvent con-
tractors would probably have no redress for their injuries. On this
point Mr. Larson states, "Some statutes, instead of covering all em-
ployers who let out work on contract, are limited to 'principal' or 'gen-
eral' contractors. This leads to some rather desperate attempts to con-
vert an ordinary entrepreneur into a 'contractor' with someone."'1 4 The
main argument against including employers is that many small business-
men might fail to require contractors to comply with the act and also
fail to take out insurance, thus subjecting themselves to a liability leading
to financial ruin.
In a case involving the North Carolina Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act, employees of an independent contractor who ran a shoe depart-
ment in defendant department store were held to be part of the "employ-
ing unit" of the department store so as to make the department store
liable for unemployment compensation taxes.' 5 Yet under the North
Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee of the shoe depart-
ment would not be considered an employee of the department store.
Georgia, which has a statutory employer provision' 6 similar to that of
North Carolina, held that employees of an independent shoe depart-
ment in a department store were not employees of the department store
for workmen's compensation purposes.17 The only basis on which North
Carolina could hold a department store liable to an employee of an in-
dependent contractor for workmen's compensation, as did the South
Carolina court in the principal case, would be the possibility of estoppel.
Estoppel was not discussed in the principal case, nor have any cases
been found applying it to a situation such as this. In the principal
case the employee of the millinery department appeared to the public
"3 Green v. Spivey, 236 N. C. 435, 443, 73 S. E. 2d 488, 494 (1952).
2I Larson, WORKMEN'S COMPENSAT ON LAw § 49.12, n. 11 (1952).
"Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. L. Harvey and Son Co., 227 N. C.
291, 42 S. E. 2d 86 (1947).
1 6 GA. CoDE ANN. § 114-112 (1935).J - M. High Co. v. Hague, 53 Ga. App. 165, 185 S. E. 141 (1936).
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to be an employee of the department store, which would probably estop
the department store from denying that she was its agent as far as third
parties who relied on this appearance to their detriment are involved.18
Here, however, the employee also actually believed that she was an em-
ployee of the dpartment store, a belief resulting from the conduct of the
department store, and its acquiescence in the conduct of the independent
contractor in concealing the actual relationship. If it had also caused
her to believe that she was covered by the workmen's compensation
policy of the department store, the cases found on this point would seem
to indicate that the store would be estopped to deny that the employee
was covered by it under the act unless the independent contractor was
also under the act.19
In the principal case the Court held that because the owner was
liable for compensation to the employee of the contractor, the owner
would be relieved of any common law liability to the employee. This
was determined under statutory language imposing absolute liability
for compensation on the principal employer, though only a secondary
liability since he could recover over from the independent contractor.
Most states have this type of act, and also relieve the employer from
any common law liability to the employees of contractors. 20
It seems that North Carolina has not abolished the common law
liability of these statutory employers. The North Carolina statute2'
makes a contractor liable for compensation to an employee of a sub-
contractor only if he fails to require that the subcontractor produce a
certificate issued by the Industrial Commission stating that such sub-
contractor has complied with the Act. Two North Carolina cases22
have held that an employee of a subcontractor was not precluded by the
Workmen's Compensation Act from maintaining a negligence action at
law against the principal contractor. In neither of the cases, however,
was it brought out whether the subcontractor had complied with the
act or whether the principal contractor was also liable for compensa-
tion.23
"82 Mechem, AGENCY § 1722 (1914). See Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N. H.
167, 5 A. 2d 667 (1939). Field's Inc. v. Evans, 36 Ohio App. 153, 172 N. E. 702(1929), noted in 29 Micu. L. REv. 640. Cf. Jewison v. Dieudonne, 127 Minn.
163, 149 N. W. 20 (1914), holding out as partner, two justices dissenting on the
ground that no reliance was shown.
1 Smith Coal Co. v. Feltner, 260 S. W. 2d 398, Ky. (1953). Vogt v. Borough
of Belmar, 14 N. J. 195, 101 A. 2d 849 (1954). Beck v. City of Reading, 120 Pa.
Super. 468, 182 A. 2d 732 (1936). Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S. C. 66, 7
S. E. 2d 712 (1940).
20 Annot., 151 A. L. R. 1359 (1944), supplemented by 166 A. L. R. 813 (1947).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (1950).
"' Cathey v. Southeastern Construction Co., 218 N. C. 525, 11 S. E. 2d 787(1940). Sales v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940).
" In neither of these cases, nor in Mack v. Marshall Field, 218 N. C. 697, 12
S. E. 2d 235 (1940) does the court seem to have considered arguments based on
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The cases from other states, which have acts similar to the North
Carolina Act, are not in accord on this problem. New York 24 and
Wisconsin 25 have held the contractor liable at common law regardless of
whether or not the subcontractor was insured, while Oklahoma,26 Mis-
souri,27 and Florida28 have held the principal contractor relieved of all
common law liability to employees of his subcontractors.
Ohio29 and Arkansas 0 have made distinctions between the cases in
which the subcontractor has complied with the act by securing insurance,
and those in which he has not, holding the employee of the subcontractor
to be the employee of the principal contractor when the subcontractor
has not complied with the act. Thus, if the subcontractor has complied
with the act there is no employer-empiloyee relationship, and the em-
ployee can bring an action at law against the principal contractor as a
third party. If, however, the subcontractor has not complied with the
act, an employer-employee relationship exists, and the employee is pre-
cluded from bringing an action at law against the principal contractor.
It is questionable whether this distinction would be made in North
Carolina. The North Carolina Act2 ' does not say that the contractor
becomes the employer of the employees of the subcontractor, but only
says that if he fails to require a certificate of the subcontractor's com-
pliance he will be liable to the same extent as if he were their employer,
and if he does require it he will not be liable for compensation insurance
actions and benefits. Since neither of the two North Carolina cases
holding the contractor liable at common law have mentioned any dis-
tinction such as that made in Ohio and Arkansas, it might seem that
the possible policy of § 97-19 as substituting compensation for common law relief
as against a superior contractor. The language of § 97-19 relieving a superior con-
tractor who has obtained the required certificate of liability to subcontractor's em-
ployees "for compensation or other benefits under this Article" may be thought to
negative any intent to relieve from common law liability. However, the amendment
in 1945 which places compensation liability on superior contractors when the sub-
contractor has less than five employees goes far toward treating the combined em-
ployments as one single enterprise with responsibility at the top. Such policy seems
further fortified by the holding that the superior contractor also need not have five
employees to be made liable for compensation, and the reasons assigned for so hold-
ing. Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 434, 53 S. E. 2d 668, 673 (1949).
24 Sweezey v. Arc Electrical Construction Co., 295 N. Y. 306, 67 N. E. 2d
369 (1946).
"Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co., 192 Wis. 44, 211 N. W. 354(1926).
" Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Howell, 200 Okla. 675, 204 P. 2d 282 (1949).
7 New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Boaz-Kiel Construction Co., 115 F. 2d 950,
8th Cir. (1940).
2 Brickley v. Gulf Coast Construction Co., 153 Fla. 216, 14 So. 2d 265 (1943).
"' Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N. E.
306 (1924).
" Lanza v. Carroll, 216 F. 2d 808, 8th Cir. (1954).
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (1950). See, however, Note 23 supra.
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none would be made in North Carolina.32  The argument against the
distinction is that by restoring the contractor's common law liabilty it
penalizes the contractor for requiring the subcontractor to comply with
the act. Since one of the purposes of the act is to encourage con-
tractors to require compliance with the act by subcontractors, this
distinction would seem to defeat the purpose of the act.
The holdings subjecting the contractor to workmen's compensation
and common law liability have not been without criticism.33 Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law states, "A sounder result would seem
to be a holding that the over-all responsibility of the general contractor
for getting the subcontractors insured, and his latent liability for
compensation if he does not, should be sufficient to remove him from
the category of 'third party'. . . . The general contractor, like the im-
mediate employer is subjected to non-fault liability for compensation,
whether you call him a statutory employer or insurer or anything else;
and he ought in return to get immunity from damage suits."3 4 It would
seem that the North Carolina act might well be amended to make
clear that this common law immunity is granted the principal contractor.
ROBERT L. GRUBB, JR.
2 However, G. S. § 97-19 was amended in 1941, following these two decisiops,
to make contractors liable irrespective of whether such sub-contractor has regularly
in service less that; five employees in the same btsiness within this state to the
same extent as such sub-contractor would be liable if he had accepted the provisions
of this article. It could be argued that such additional burden on the contractor
should relieve him of common law liability to these same employees. This view
would seem more in line with other authorities, but there have been no cases on this
point since the amendment. It would seem to create an undue burden on a con-
tractor to make him liable for workmen's compensation and also liable for com-
mon law negligence to employees of a sub-contractor who does not have five em-
ployees and it is not covered by the act.
3
=Note, 39 VA. L. REv. 951, 959 (1953).
2,2 Larson, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAw § 72.31 (1952).
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